Sunday, 16 October 2011

The Origin and nature of command responsibility

Command responsibility depicts the responsibility every commander has to assure respect for the law of war within his sphere of command and with particular responsibility for law of war training organization measures & preparedness to solve problems resulting from specific circumstances.
These responsibility are enshrined in the Geneva protocols  
3.1 General responsibility as it relates to overall responsibility in military operations and to the responsibility every commander has with regards to the law of war.
3.2 Law of war training as it relates to training sub ordinate military members on the means and methods of warfare.
3.3specific circumstances which this IHL will apply or aid them as hors de combatant, or belligerents
The Rule is that the commander of all forces engaged in a military operation has the military responsibility to ensure respect for the law of war.
According to situation he will be the commander in chief himself and thereafter the commander of any commander with an independent mission in a larger area. Furthermore command responsibility extends to the powers to be extended to all lands and seas, air areas of military operations movements & location. (1)
Thus superior is [1]normally the instructor of his subordinates also for law of war training & as concerns warfare. The Commander has to distinguish and to solve two types of problems regarding organization
(a) Measures to be taken by military commanders
(b) Measures to be taken in co operation with or exclusively by civilian authorities and or civilian pass.
Etymologically the doctrine of “command responsibility” was established by the Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) and applied for the first time by the German Supreme Court in Leipzig after World War I, on the Trial of Emil Muller[2]. Miller was sentenced by the Court for failing to prevent the commission of crimes and to punish the perpetrators thereof. Command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability: the superior is responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates and for failing to

Prevent or punish (as opposed to crimes he ordered). The doctrine was invoked by the International Military Tribunals after World War II and developed further through international and domestic jurisprudence: inter alia, the High Command, In Re Yamashita, Hostages and Abbaye Ardenne[3] cases after World War II, and the Medina case dealing with war crimes in Vietnam. By 1977 the doctrine of command responsibility was accepted as customary international law and was codified in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the International Armed Conflicts. Its status as customary law was confirmed with the
explicit inclusion of command responsibility in article 7(3) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and article 6(3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as article 28 of the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC). It should be noted that international law recognizes the principle of command responsibility both in international and in internal armed conflict. Thus, the ICTR Statute explicitly provides for command responsibility, including for grave breaches of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, in the context of the conflict in Rwanda, which is by definition application of superior liability in a non-international conflict.


The ICTY in the Celebici case elaborated a threefold requirement for the existence of command responsibility, which has been confirmed by subsequent jurisprudence:
1. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
2. That the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and
3. That the superior failed to take the reasonable measures to prevent the criminal actor to punish the perpetrator thereof.
In this sense, command responsibility is a form of complicity under international law; in conclusion this rule is president and will be readily enforced on against any person.


[1] Geographic extent .H. iv. Preamble .G.P 1,86,87 (Hand book of international humanitarian law 2004)
[2] ICRC.ORG(http://www.hlc-rdc.org/uploads/editor/Command%20Responsibility.pdf)
[3] http://www.hlc-rdc.org/uploads/editor/Command%20Responsibility.pdf

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